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Feature Article 
S c o t t i s h Investment Trusts : Prospect and Retrospect 
by P Draper, J S tevens , 
Department or Economics 
Introduction 
In l a t e 1982 - e a r l y 1983, t h e r e was cons ide rab le d i s q u i e t wi th in S c o t t i s h 
f i n a n c i a l c i r c l e s over t h e f u t u r e of I n v e s t m e n t T r u s t s under S c o t t i s h 
s t ewardsh ip . Coming as i t did a f t e r an a b o r t i v e takeover for t he Royai Bank 
and t h e c o n t r o v e r s i a l t a k e o v e r of Anderson S t r a t h c l y d e , t h e r e a c t i o n may 
have been unde r s t andab le . Suspic ions ot an English conspiracy were a i r ed by 
an e a g e r f i n a n c i a l p r e s s and "conce rn" was rumoured t o be t h e o r d e r of t h e 
day a t S t Andrews House. However, in t e r m s of a s s e t s under management , 
S c o t l a n d emerged a t t h e end of 1983 w i t h a s i m i l a r p r o p o r t i o n of t h e UK 
t o t a l as e x i s t e d a t t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e y e a r . Indeed , a new management 
group, S t a n e c a s t l e Asse t s , became managers of the Yorkshire and Lancashire 
Trus t which promptly acquired the l a r g e r Young Companies. Both these t r u s t s 
were formerly Engl ish based o p e r a t i o n s . In e a r l y 1984, S t a n e c a s t l e signed 
up t h e s m a l l E n g l i s h t r u s t , S n i r e s I n v e s t m e n t w h i l s t S c o t t i s h Nor the rn 
a c q u i r e d 3 s m a l l London b a s e d , p r i v a t e c o n c e r n s . The UK t r u s t s e c t o r has 
been c o n t r a c t i n g s ince the mid 197CPs, and the r a t e of c o n t r a c t i o n has been 
s i m i l a r on both s i d e s of the border . Thus, a l though the i m p l i c a t i o n s of any 
" th r ea t* to Investment T rus t s can be argued t o be s t a r k e r for the S c o t t i s h 
economy, i t shou ld be c l e a r t h a t any c o n s p i r a c y which does e x i s t has no 
p a r t i c u l a r S c o t t i s h d i m e n s i o n . The p r o b l e m s f a c i n g t r u s t s e x i s t 
i r r e s p e c t i v e of geographica l l o c a t i o n ; the o v e r a l l p ressure to c o n t r a c t i s 
l i k e l y to cont inue and i t i s h ighly probable t h a t t he casua l ty l i s t , on both 
s i d e s of t h e b o r d e r , w i l l grow. I t i s t h i s d i s t u r b i n g t r e n d , t h e r e a s o n s 
for i t , and how i t might be reversed t h a t t h i s paper seeks to exp lore . 
Investment Trusts and Discounts 
An I n v e s t m e n t T r u s t i s a l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y company whose a s s e t s a r e a 
p o r t f o l i o of s t o c k s and s h a r e s and whose e q u i t y i s t r a d e d on the s t o c k 
exchange in t h e same way as t h a t of any o t h e r quoted company. Un l ike 
u n i t h o l d e r s , the sha reho lde r s of an Investment Trust a re the owners of the 
f i rm and as such enjoy r i g h t s s i m i l a r t o t h e owners of any o t h e r p u b l i c 
company. The a t t r a c t i o n s of t h i s v e h i c l e t o i n v e s t o r s a r e s a i d to be 
t h r e e f o l d . F i r s t l y , t h e i n v e s t m e n t i s s p r e a d over a l a r g e number of 
s e c u r i t i e s t h u s r e d u c i n g t h e t o t a l r i s k i n v o l v e d . Second ly , I n v e s t m e n t 
T rus t s provide p o r t f o l i o management which may f a c i l i t a t e informed dec i s ion 
making , enhanced p e r f o r m a n c e and open up i n v e s t m e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s not 
normally a v a i l a b l e to smal l p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r s . Management can be suppl ied 
N in house ' by the t r u s t s own employees or , as i s now predominently the case , 
by a company o f f e r i n g such a c t i v i t i e s . In e i t h e r c a s e , t h i s e x p e r t i s e i s 
t y p i c a l l y provided cheaply r e l a t i v e to t h a t of o ther f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , 
notably u n i t t r u s t s . Th i rd ly , t r u s t s can r a i s e debt in order to expand the 
a s s e t s and t h u s d e r i v e t he b e n e f i t s of " g e a r i n g * which , fo r t h e i n v e s t o r , 
magnif ies the fo r tunes or mis for tunes of the p o r t f o l i o and thus the value of 
h i s h o l d i n g . U n t i l r e c e n t l y , h igh i n t e r e s t r a t e s had k i l l e d t h e i s s u e of 
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d e b e n t u r e s and, as t r u s t s r e t i r e d e x i s t i n g s t o c k , t h i s advan tage assumed 
v i r t u a l l y no i m p o r t a n c e in a l a r g e number of c a s e s . There a r e a number of 
t r u s t s p r e p a r e d t o borrow s h o r t , u s u a l l y in o v e r s e a s m a r k e t s , in o r d e r t o 
f inance var ious kinds of a r b i t r a g e opera t ions and t h i s i s l i k e l y to continue 
w i t h high r ewards fo r t h o s e who succeed in g e t t i n g i t r i g h t . However, in 
t e r m s of long term d e b t , t h e r e i s no c l e a r ev idence of a t r e n d by managers 
towards more adventurous l e v e l s of gea r ing . Since 1982, severa l t r u s t s have 
issued debentures , both by convent ional means and via ins t ruments designed 
to postpone much of the i n t e r e s t payment. Such developments are encouraging 
bu t i t would not y e t be t r u e t o i n f e r t h a t t h e p r e v a i l i n g a t t i t u d e of 
c a u t i o n i s changing in any s i g n i f i c a n t way. This i s u n f o r t u n a t e because 
most p r i v a t e and indeed i n s t i t u t i o n a l i nves to r s cannot d i r e c t l y put toge ther 
a levered p o r t f o l i o . 
As w i t h a l l p u b l i c companies , t h e s h a r e c a p i t a l of an I n v e s t m e n t T r u s t i s 
f i x e d and t h e s h a r e p r i c e i s d e t e r m i n e d in t he market by t h e f o r c e s of 
supply and demand. This p r o v i d e s a major c o n t r a s t w i th u n i t t r u s t s which 
a r e ' o p e n ended* in t h a t t he fund can be c o n t r a c t e d or expanded as demand 
a l t e r s . Therefore, the supply curve for un i t s can be regarded as pe r f ec t l y 
e l a s t i c with p r ice se t by the mangement on the b a s i s of a range determined 
by Depar tment of Trade r e g u l a t i o n s , given t h e va lue of t he u n d e r l y i n g 
p o r t f o l i o . However, t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between an I n v e s t m e n t T r u s t s h a r e 
p r ice and the inheren t claim on the po r t fo l i o i s not r i g i d l y fixed because 
the share p r i c e i s market determined. This has led to a s i t u a t i o n where i t 
has been poss ib le to buy for 100p a claim on a s s e t s worth 120p to 135p. The 
f a c t t h a t the overwhelming majori ty of Investment Trust shares have stood, 
and cont inue to s tand , a t such ' d i s c o u n t s ' i s the root cause of the t r oub l e s 
f a c i n g the s e c t o r . The ' d i s c o u n t ' has prompted the bulk of c o r p o r a t e 
a c t i v i t y in r e c e n t y e a r s and w i l l c o n t i n u e t o be t he eng ine of d e c l i n e , i f 
not addressed. 
The 1970's - The Rot Sets In 
High d i s c o u n t s were not a lways t h e norm. The 1 9 5 0 ' s and 1960 ' s were 
r e l a t i v e l y good t i m e s for I n v e s t m e n t T r u s t s and were c h a r a c t e r i z e d by 
p e r i o d s of expans ion v i a both r i g h t s i s s u e s and t r u s t f o r m a t i o n s . There 
were a l s o merger waves a t the t u r n of both d e c a d e s . Such a c t i v i t y may be 
e x p l a i n e d t o a l a r g e e x t e n t as be ing p a r t of a p r o c e s s of r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . 
Typica l ly , two or more t r u s t s from the same group combined to form a l a r g e r 
u n i t with the aim 01 improving m a r k e t a b i l i t y , enhancing the a b i l i t y to r a i s e 
funds and s e c u r i n g economies of s c a l e . The expans ion con t i nued i n t o the 
1 9 7 0 ' s and in 1972 40 new t r u s t s were formed. However, the e r a of ' c h e a p * 
money and r i s i n g m a r k e t s had a lmos t come and gone and, in the bear market 
t h a t fol lowed, d i scounts soared and have never looked l i k e re tu rn ing to the 
l e v e l s of 1 9 5 0 ' s and 1 9 6 0 ' s . The r e a s o n s f o r t h i s a r e complex and 
i n t e r c o n n e c t e d and have led t o t h e observed s p i r a l of c o n t r a c t i o n and 
d e c l i n e . Both t h e a d v e r s e f i s c a l reg ime on t r u s t s and the e f f e c t s of UK 
exchange c o n t r o l s cons t ra ined p o r t f o l i o choice a t a t ime when f l e x i b i l i t y 
would have been more than welcome. Fur ther , exchange r e g u l a t i o n s involved a 
s p e c i a l pool of cu r r ency th rough which f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t r e q u i r e d to be 
f i n a n c e d . This s c a r c e r e s o u r c e was t r a d e d a t a premium over t he o f f i c i a l 
exchange r a t e s , and when i n v e s t m e n t cur rency was s o l d , t h e r e was in l a t e r 
years a sur render of 25J to the Bank of England a t o f f i c i a l r a t e s . This in 
i t s e l f s e v e r e l y r e s t r i c t e d t r u s t s and p reven ted s w i t c h e s i n t o and out of 
d i f f e r e n t fore ign markets . However, to circumvent these r e s t r i c t i o n s , many 
t r u s t s borrowed overseas to inves t in other markets , notably the US. Such 
l o a n s were ' b a c k to back ' which r e q u i r e d t h a t t r u s t s d e p o s i t a roughly 
e q u i v a l e n t amount of s h o r t term paper to t h a t borrowed w i t h t h e o v e r s e a s 
lending i n s t i t u t i o n . In add i t i on , Bank of England r egu la t i ons d i c t a t e d t ha t 
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such loans be backed with securities valued at 115$ of the given loan and 
that this additional 15% investment cover had to be financed through the 
currency pool. For a number of trusts this practice resulted in disaster. 
As the Bretton-Wood agreement disintegrated and exchange rates floated, many 
trusts found themselves invested in falling markets and falling currencies 
financed with borrowings in rising currencies. This implied a continuous 
need to provide the required additional backing on a rising dollar premium. 
Such currency mismatching caused widespread losses and severely damaged the 
reliable image of the sector as a whole. As suggested above, much of the 
debt issued in earlier periods expired during the 1970%s and in the face of 
equity returns lower than the cost of borrowing, trust managers were 
understandably unwilling to rebuild gearing. 
If these set-backs had taken place in isolation, then the trust sector would 
by now have been well on the way to recovery. However, these problems 
manifested themselves against the continuation of a more fundamental and in 
many respects, more worrying trend. During the 1970*s and 1980%s, an ever-
increasing proportion of trust equity was held by other financial 
institutions such as pension funds and life assurance companies. The 
situation in the trust sector mirrors that prevailing in the UK stock market 
as a whole. Since the mid-195CTs, the personal sector has been a net seller 
of corporate securities. In 1963, the percentage of UK equities accounted 
for directly by private shareholders was 54.0% whilst financial institutions 
accounted for 30.3%. By 1981, 'persons" held 28.2% and institutions 
57.9%. ' Survey data suggest that such trends were evident also in the 
trust sector. Between 1971 and 1981, identified personal holdings of trust 
equity fell from 46? to 2.8% with almost all the net sales being absorbed by 
institutional investors^ . The reasons for the general perecentage decline 
in equity holdings are many and varied with the UK fiscal arrangements being 
the prime influence. As well as directly affecting the ability of 
individuals to buy and hold shares, the UK tax system actually encourages 
savers to invest in equities indirectly via pension funds, and a variety of 
insurance linked savings schemes. Further, the growth of building society 
deposits and the increasing investment in housing also restrict the funds 
available for share-ownership. Successive governments have done little to 
counteract these pressures and direct investment in equities still presents 
private individuals with considerable fiscal penalties relative to both 
indirect investment and investment in bricks and mortar. 
For a variety of reasons this situation is more problematical for trusts 
than for other types of quoted companies. The historical rationale for 
Investment Trusts is to cater for the small private invester. Although the 
number of individual shareholdings in trusts has increased since the 1950%s, 
the total value of personal investors holdings has declined markedly leaving 
the institutions in the driving seat and the trust sector extremely 
vulnerable. Since the 1950xs and 1960"s many of the institutions who were 
net buyers of trust equity had developed their own' Mn-house1 management 
facilities. Thus they had little use for a portfolio managed in a similar 
way to their own operations and were only willing to hold such a package at 
prices which implied substantial discounts. Secondly, for tax-exempt funds, 
it was not logical to hold an investment vehicle whose internal workings 
were subject to various UK taxes unless the price reflected this 
disadvantage. Thirdly, with investment currency a scarce resource, 
institutions were restricted from adopting the overseas exposure which they 
felt desirable. Acquisition of trusts with overseas holdings could resolve 
this by allowing transfer of trust assets to the acquiror with no surrender 
of the investment currency premium. Fourthly, institutions that held trust 
shares recorded them at market value in the calculation of their own assets. 
However, because of the discount, the break-up value of a trust then becomes 
greater than its value as a going concern. Most offers for trust equity are 
at or near net asset value resulting in immediate gain due to the 
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r e v a l u a t i o n 01 any e x i s t i n g h o l d i n g s . F u r t h e r , for t h o s e i n s t i t u t i o n s 
in tending to absorb the p o r t f o l i o i n to t h e i r own o p e r a t i o n s , t he r e r e s u l t s a 
saving in commissions and stamp duty. A recent study o f - t r u s t takeovers by 
Draper and S t e v e n s ( 3 ) con f i rms t h a t , on a v e r a g e , t h e r e were s i g n i f i c a n t 
gains to the shareholders of acquired t r u s t s and t h a t these were not o f f se t 
by l o s s e s to the equi ty holders of the acqui r ing company. Indeed t h i s study 
i n d i c a t e s t h e p o s s i b l e e x i s t e n c e of g a i n s t o t h e a c q u i r o r which were 
d i s c o u n t e d by the marke t in t he months p r e c e e d i n g t h e announcement of t he 
bid. F i n a l l y , for quoted companies, the a c q u i s i t i o n of a t r u s t provided an 
oppor tun i ty , in d i f f i c u l t t imes , to expand t h e i r equity base and r e a l i s e the 
l i q u i d a s s e t s of the t r u s t to finance investment o p p o r t u n i t i e s . Thus o ther 
companies could acquire t r u s t s in order to a l t e r t h e i r c a p i t a l s t r u c t u r e in 
a way s i m i l a r t o t h e e f f e c t s of a r i g h t s i s s u e . Thus a t t a c k s on t h e t r u s t 
sec to r presented o ther i n s i t u t i o n s with a p o t e n t i a l l y rewarding course of 
a c t i o n . 
By the l a t e 197CTs t h e r e was l i t t l e sign of the discount narrowing. Before 
1977 the re had been a number of l i q u i d a t i o n s , u n i t i z a t i o n s and takeovers a l l 
concerning small t r u s t s whose d i r e c t o r s had endorsed such moves in order to 
allow shareho lders to r e a l i z e t h e i r investments a t or near net a s s e t value. 
In e a r l y 1977, t h e B r i t i s h Rai l Pens ion Fund ( B r i t r a i l p e n ) b id fo r t he 
S t anda rd T r u s t . Th i s bid was c o n t e s t e d by the t r u s t d i r e c t o r s who 
eventua l ly thwarted i t by agreeing terms with Prudent ia l Assurance. During 
1977 t he r e were a number of t r u s t s acquired by quoted companies from other 
s e c t o r s . In the autumn of the year , B r i t r a i l p e n t r i e d again and were jo ined 
by an another publ ic sec tor pension fund, Black Diamond Pensions (NCB). The 
t a r g e t s were two s i z a b l e Edinburgh based t r u s t s , Edinburgh and Dundee and 
the B r i t i s h Investment Trus t . Again, both approaches were hot ly contes ted 
but t h i s t i m e B r i t r a i l p e n were s u c c e s s f u l w h i l s t Black Diamond ga ined 
c o n t r o l of 83$ of t h e e q u i t y of BIT which r ema ins a quoted t r u s t . There 
were two more such a s s a u l t s in 1978. However the p ressure was eased by the 
incoming C o n s e r v a t i v e government which a b o l i s h e d exchange c o n t r o l s and 
introduced f i s c a l concess ions making t r u s t s tax t r anspa ren t by e l im ina t i ng 
t h e n e c e s s i t y of paying c a p i t a l g a i n s tax on i n t e r n a l t r a n s a c t i o n s . This 
l a t t e r s t e p removed a major o b j e c t i o n of exempt funds to t r u s t s and 
s t imu la t ed many of them to increase t h e i r holdings of t r u s t equ i ty . 
The 198(Ts - Renewed Attack 
Abst rac t ing from a f a l s e dawn in 1980, the more favourable c l ima te did not 
r e s u l t in a s i g n i f i c a n t reduct ion in average d i scoun t s . The personal sec tor 
remained a net s e l l e r of t r u s t s tock. Unfortunately, the g rea t e r freedom to 
i n v e s t in f o r e i g n m a r k e t s f o l l o w i n g the l i f t i n g of exchange c o n t r o l s 
r e s u l t e d in a s u b s t a n t i a l switching of funds overseas a t a time when the UK 
s t o c k marke t was r e l a t i v e l y s t r o n g . In a d d i t i o n t h i s s w i t c h invo lved the 
b e a r i n g of heavy t r a n s a c t i o n s c o s t s . By 1981 the p r e s s u r e was back on and 
l a r g e i n s t i t u t i o n a l s h a r e h o l d e r s were demanding marked changes in t h e 
o p e r a t i o n s of many t r u s t s . There were two broad t h r u s t s t o t h e a t t a c k . 
F i r s t , t h e r e were demands for g r e a t e r s p e c i a l i s a t i o n . Most i n s t i t u t i o n s 
have the e x p e r t i z e to manage a well d i v e r s i f i e d p o r t f o l i o covering a l a rge 
number of m a r k e t s and s e c t o r s , and as e x p l a i n e d above , see no f u t u r e in 
subcon t rac t ing such a c t i v i t y to Investment Trus t s . However, the majori ty of 
t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e not geared up t o manage p o r t f o l i o s s p e c i a l i z i n g in 
g e o g r a p h i c a l a r e a s , i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r s or unquoted companies . Whi l s t 
s p e c i a l i z a t i o n c o u l d w e l l l e a d t o h i g h e r management e x p e n s e s , t h e 
i n s t i t u t i o n s appear to b e l i e v e t h a t c o s t s w i l l be more than o f f s e t by 
enhanced pe r fo rmance and t h a t t he r e s u l t a n t i n c r e a s e d demand would cause 
s h a r e p r i c e s t o r i s e and d i s c o u n t t o f a l l . This case i s r e i n f o r c e d by 
re fe rence to e x i s t i n g s p e c i a l i s t t r u s t s which often t rade at below average 
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discounts. There were and continue to be two possible problems. It is not 
clear that many of the trust management teams possess the expertise to run a 
specialist portfolio from existing resources. In addition, specialisation 
is likely to alter the risk profile of the trust. The relationship between 
the trust share returns and those of the market may alter and that component 
of total risk not accounted for by the market (i.e. the specific risk) is 
likely to increase. Thus if the sector or geographical area of 
specialisation performs relatively badly, share prices can tumble and 
discounts rise. Historically, the discounts of specialist trusts have 
tended to be volatile which makes them less suitable for smaller investors. 
However, if specialisation looks a dubious proposition for a trust, the 
institutions have a second card to play - unitization. This involves the 
reogrganization of an Investment Trust into a unit trust, thus giving equity 
holders units in place of their shareholdings. As indicated above, the 
price of a unit is closely related to the value of the underlying assets. 
This route allows a trust shareholder to realize his investment at something 
approaching net asset value after allowance for the costs of the unutization 
exercise. Net funds such as insurance companies find this approach 
acceptable as it allows them the opportunity to phase redemptions of units 
in a way which minimizes capital gains tax liability. 
In 1981, under pressure from insitutional shareholders, two large, London 
based management groups announced rationalization plans for the trusts 
under their control. In aggregate these two groups accounted for almost 20? 
of then existing trust assets. The proposals by Robert Fleming for the 13 
trusts in their stable were savaged by the institutions and the group were 
forced to make substantial revisions including unitization for 3 trusts with 
assets of £120 m. However, Electronic Rentals stepped in and acquired one 
of the unitization candidates, London and Montrose, in what can be best 
regarded as a rights issue. The Touche-Remnant (TR) management group fared 
a little better. They proposed specialisation for 9 of their 11 trusts and 
offered to unitize the Cedar Investment Trust with assets in the region of 
£45 m. At the time there was a strong body of opinion that the TR plan did 
not go far enough in terms of unitization and a suspicion that the group did 
not have the expertize to provide the specialist management proposed. 
However, TR escaped the mauling handed out to Fleming and the planned re-
organisation was sanctioned. In early 1983 another London managed company, 
Broadstone Investment Trust was forced to unitize and others were put under 
considerable pressure to do so by aggressive shareholders such as London and 
Manchester Assurance. During this period there were well publicized moves 
against Scottish Trusts. In 1982, the small Canadian and Foreign Investment 
Trust, managed by Martin Currie was forced to unitize. At the turn of the 
year the pressure was applied to a larger trust in that group, Scottish 
Ontario, and the East of Scotland managed Dominion and General. At the same 
time the London based Throgmorton Trust bid for East of Scotlandxs Pentland 
Investment Trust, which countered by seeking to join Scottish Ontario and 
Dominion and General in unitization and thus provide further assets for the 
proposed unit management company owned jointly by Martin Currie and the 
British Linen Bank. After a particularly bitter struggle, this move failed 
in May 1983 when Pentland directors conceded defeat and accepted acquisition 
by Throgmorton. Whilst this activity was taking place, the Aberdeen Trust 
sealed the fate of East of Scotland Fund Managers by buying itself out of 
its management deal and setting up its own management company. As suggested 
earlier, the activities of the recently formed Stanecastle Assets have gone 
some way to countering the erosion of trust assets under Scottish 
management. However, whilst complacency would be foolhardy, the record does 
not indicate a vendetta aimed solely at Scottish Trusts. Scottish Trusts 
are caught in a vice which is squeezing the whole industry and to shelter 
behind nationalist rhetoric is, in the final analysis, no defence. 
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I t has been e s t i m a t e d t h a t I n v e s t m e n t t r u s t s a ccoun t fo r one s i x t h of t h e 
a s s e t s managed by S c o t t i s h based i n s t i t u t i o n s . ( 4 ) One major problem i s t h a t 
S c o t t i s h managment groups a r e more heav i ly dependent on t r u s t bus iness than 
London ba$e3 c o n c e r n s . On the b a s i s of p r o f i l e s p u b l i s h e d by Wood, 
Mackenzie ^ ^ only Edinburgh Fund Managers , Ivory and Sime and Murray 
Johnstone are involved in o ther fund management a c t i v i t y to any s i g n i f i c a n t 
e x t e n t . Thus, t h e c o n t i n u e d e c l i p s e of I n v e s t m e n t T r u s t s could e rode job 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s in fund management and in t he long run pose q u e s t i o n s about 
the v i a b i l i t y of a major plank of the Sco t t i sh F inanc ia l System. Tne case 
fo r expans ion and d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n i s c l e a r . However t he e x t i n c t i o n of 
Investment Trus t s i s fa r from c e r t a i n and in the fo r seeab le fu tu re , only a 
few of t h e r e m a i n i n g S c o t t i s h T r u s t s a r e a t r i s k . Th i s i s because t h e 
m a j o r i t y of S c o t t i s h management teams a r e wide ly r ega rded as be ing both 
i n n o v a t i v e and s u c c e s s f u l . Academic a n a l y s e s of t r u s t pe r fo rmance would 
deny t h e e x i s t e n c e of any such c o m p a r a t i v e advan tage fo r t h e s e c t o r as a 
whole. These s tud i e s contend t h a t managers are not able to genera te r e t u r n s 
in excess of t h a t expected on the b a s i s of the l eve l of r i sk assumed by the 
t r u s t . Th i s i m p l i e s t h a t , g iven most t r u s t s have w e l l d i v e r s i f i e d 
p o r t f o l i o s , good i n v e s t m e n t d e c i s i o n s a r e o f f s e t by baa d e c i s i o n s and 
ques t ionab le l e v e l s of t r a n s a c t i o n s c o s t s . Clear ly , one way to obvia te such 
c r i t i c i s m i s t o opera te with a l e s s than d i v e r s i f i e d p o r t f o l i o , a s t r a t egy 
which only t h e s m a l l e r s p e c i a l i s t t r u s t come near t o a d o p t i n g . As Wood, 
Mackenzie p o i n t o u t ( 6 ) , t h e overwhelming m a j o r i t y of a s s e t s a r e s t i l l 
managed in general t r u s t s with r i s k s spread across many markets and s e c t o r s . 
If the presen t p a t t e r n s 01 ownership p e r s i s t , general t r u s t s , by refusing to 
o f f e r a p r o d u c t not a v a i l a b l e in i n s t i t u t i o n s , w i l l f ace t h e t a s k of 
c o n v i n c i n g t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n a l s h a r e h o l d e r s t h a t t h e i r p roduc t i s b e t t e r 
than the x i n - h o u s e * v e r s i o n . On the b a s i s of t h e e v i d e n c e a v a i l a b l e t o 
da te t h i s w i l l be d i f f i c u l t to achieve in the long run. The firm conclusion 
i s t h a t many t r u s t s wil r equ i r e to r eappra i se t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s . Unt i l t h i s 
happens,given the present c i rcumstances , the sec to r as a whole w i l l cont inue 
to c o n t r a c t . 
Trusts Fight Back 
The t r u s t i n d u s t r y i t s e l f has not been c o m p l a c e n t . The A s s o c i a t i o n 01 
Investment Trus t s (AITC) which ac t s as a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e and l o b b y i s t for the 
s e c t o r , h a s t a k e n s t e p s t o e n c o u r a g e t r u s t s t o p r o v i d e more b a s i c 
informat ion about t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s to the f i n a n c i a l community, to improve 
t h e i r g e n e r a l image and t o de f ine c l e a r l y t h e i r i n v e s t m e n t o b j e c t i v e s . 
Fur the r , the AITC i s cu r r en t l y undertaking l a rge publ ic r e l a t i o n s exe rc i s e 
t o inc rease awareness and to present a higher p r o f i l e , e s p e c i a l l y with the 
p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r . The j u s t i f i c a t i o n for such expendi ture i s t h a t the growth 
in t h e number of u n i t h o l d e r s and t h e l a r g e number of e x i s t i n g p r i v a t e 
s h a r e h o l d e r s i s c l e a r ev idence of marke t p o t e n t i a l . Thus, much of t h i s 
m a r k e t i n g a c t i v i t y i n v o l v e s c o n t r a s t i n g t r u s t s h a r e s w i th u n i t s . The 
a d v a n t a g e s of t r u s t s a r e t h a t management c h a r g e s a r e l o w e r , a l e v e r e d 
p o r t f o l i o i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y p o s s i b l e and t h e r e a r e fewer r e s t r i c t i o n s on 
i n v e s t m e n t p o l i c y . I r o n i c a l l y , the e x i s t e n c e of d i s c o u n t s i s f r e q u e n t l y 
used as a s e l l i n g po in t . Unit t r u s t s , on the o ther hand, can a d v e r t i s e and 
a r e so ld t h rough a more e x t e n s i v e r e t a i l ne twork where i n i t i a l c o s t s of 
purchase a re o i t en lower. In add i t i on , purchases of u n i t s can be l inked to 
f i s c a l l y s u b s i d i z e d i n s u r a n c e schemes and i t i s o f t en p o s s i b l e to s w i t c h 
cheaply between u n i t s in the same s t a b l e . Fur ther , t h e r e are usua l ly c l e a r 
f i n a n c i a l i n c e n t i v e s for b a n k e r s , a c c o u n t a n t s and b r o k e r s to push u n i t s . 
The AITC s t r a t e g y appea r s t o be one of d i r e c t l y t a r g e t i n g t h e p e r s o n a l 
s a v e r , a l t h o u g h a campaign aimed a t f i n a n c i a l c o u n c e l l o r s and a d v i s o r s i s 
not r u l e d o u t . By i n c r e a s i n g t h e s t o c k of p u b l i c l y a v a i l a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n 
and reducing i t s cos t , the AITC hopes to inf luence the savings dec i s ions of 
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the p r i v a t e sec tor and h a l t the f l i g h t from t r u s t equ i ty . Recent work by 
Draper and Stevens^ ' concludes t h a t the Investment Trust sec to r i s 
e f f i c i e n t in t h e sense t h a t p r i c e s r e f l e c t a l l p u b l i c l y a v a i l a b l e 
information about the performance and prospec ts of a given company. In 
other words, the observed sharepr ice i s the bes t e s t ima te of the value of 
the claim given a l l t h a t i s cu r r en t ly known about the t r u s t in ques t ion . 
Any attempt to change the s t ructure 01 the information set , if successful, 
w i l l a l t e r the market outcome. Thus i t i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y poss ib le for the 
AITC marketing drive to work. Unfortunately there are grounds for believing 
that any impact wil l be small. F i r s t ly direct par t ic ipat ion in equi t ies is 
not tax e f f i c i e n t . Secondly, u n i t s and depos i t s l i k e bui ld ing soc ie ty 
accounts are more accessible and convenient in a number of ways to savers. 
This imposes further costs on shareholders in addition to the existing high 
fees associated with small deals. Given the strong academic evidence that UK 
savers are ra t iona l , u t i l i t y maximizing individuals , the present instut ional 
and l eg i s l a t i ve arrangements would appear to mi l i t a t e against a wholesale 
change in savings p a t t e r n s and hence cas t doubt on the a b i l i t y of the AITC 
to engineer more than a marginal change in the behaviour of p r iva t e 
inves tors . 
There have a lso been a s e r i e s of defensive measures undertaken by t r u s t s 
themselves. A small number of t rus t mergers have been engineered to provide 
a l a rge r a s s e t base for highly ra ted managers. The merger between the 
Glasgow based Great Northern Investment Trust and the London based RIT, and 
indeed the controversial Throgmorton-Pentland amalgamation can be viewed as 
examples of t h i s . The normal route of expanding a f i rms equity via a r i g h t s 
issue i s effectively ruled out in the t rus t sector because of the discount. 
The i s sue of new shares (a t a s se t value) the pr ice of which immediately 
plunge to a discount i s c lear ly not a t t r a c t i ve to investors. Hence the need 
for e x i s t i n g t r u s t s to seek new equi ty in other ways. Wood, Mackenzie (8) 
re fe r to t h i s t rend as a process of "Construct ive Cannibalism". Such 
mergers a l so have the advantage of inc reas ing the s i z e , and thus reducing 
the probabili ty of predatory raids on the amalgamated unit . Secondly there 
have been faint signs that some managers are now prepared to experiment with 
more adventurous l e v e l s of long-term gear ing . The Sco t t i sh management 
group, B a i l l i e , G i f fo rd have p rov ided a c l e a r l ead and i t w i l l be 
i n s t r u c t i v e to see whether the r e s t of the sec tor w i l l follow in the near 
future. As suggested, gearing can cut both ways, and the present reticence 
amongst fund managers i s a clear indication that there remains considerable 
unce r t a in ty regarding the fu ture prospects of the UK and world economy. 
Thirdly , the Edinburgh based Sco t t i sh American Investment have recen t ly 
announced an insurance linked savings scheme in conjunction with Sun Life. 
This a l lows shares to be purchased with the p reva i l i ng tax incen t ives and 
wil l permit indirect advertising of the shares of the t rus t concerned. This 
idea has been advocated for at l e a s t 5 years and was ruled out because i t 
was f e l t t h a t i t would not appeal to the insurance companies because i t 
would provide compet i t ion to e x i s t i n g schemes with cons iderab le sunk 
marketing c o s t s . I t i s too ear ly to say whether i t w i l l be poss ib le for 
o thers to follow Sco t t i sh American and although such deals have vast 
potential to increase the demand for t rus t equity, i t i s l ikely that only a 
few companies w i l l be able to take advantage of i t . Four thly , the re has 
been an inc reas ing trend towards some kind of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n . However, 
ana lys i s by Wood, Mackenzie, suggests t h a t most t r u s t s remain general in 
nature and, as argued above, th i s may not sat isfy in s t i t u t iona l shareholders 
in the longer run. Some aspects of special izat ion are par t icular ly welcome. 
The main i n t e r e s t in "unquoted* companies and inc reas ing w i l l i ngnes s to 
provide venture c a p i t a l should be applauded and can only improve the 
prospec ts of the B r i t i s h economy. However, v iab le p ropos i t ions are in 
l imited supply and such investments imply increased management costs so that 
although the rewards are high, such ac t iv i ty can only be a par t ia l solution 
to the discount problem for a re la t ive ly small number of t r u s t s . The same 
argument app l i e s to the so -ca l l ed " d i r t y - t r u s t " which s p e c i a l i z e s in 
unquoted f i n a n c i a l companies and in the provison of f i nanc i a l s e rv i ce s . 
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Again t h e r e i s only room for a few to p lay t h i s game e f f e c t i v e l y . At t h e 
p resen t t ime fu r the r s p e c i a l i z a t i o n involving smal le r p o r t f o l i o s which are 
not fu l ly d i v e r s i f i e d i s urgent ly requ i red . If the l a rge number of general 
t r u s t s do not follow t h i s rou te , demand w i l l be s a t i s f i e d by new companies 
and the weaker companies w i l l continue to be picked off. The tempta t ion for 
companies outwi th the sec tor to use t r u s t s to engineer r i g h t s i s sue remains 
s t r o n g as t h e r e c e n t ep i sode wi th G u i n e s s Peat and Moorside d e m o n s t r a t e s . 
The i n s t i t u t i o n a l s h a r e h o l d e r s remain and c o n t i n u e t o t a k e a hard view of 
many o p e r a t i o n s . The p r e s e n t s t a t e of play s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e r e w i l l be 
fu r t he r c a s u a l t i e s on both s ides of the border in the fo reseeab le f u t u r e . 
Final Solutions 
Trus t s could do more to r e t r i e v e the s i t u a t i o n . Clear ly more s p e c i a l i s a t i o n 
ought to be on the agenda as should h i g h e r l e v e l s of g e a r i n g . However, 
p r e l i m i n a r y i n v e s t i g a t i o n s by Draper and S t e v e n s , s u g g e s t t h a t t h e t o t a l 
c o s t s in e i t h e r u n i t i z i n g or l i q u i d a t i n g t r u s t s a r e low r e l a t i v e t o 
p r e v a i l i n g d i s c o u n t s . Given t h e o t h e r major f i n d i n g t h a t t he s e c t o r i s 
e f f i c i e n t , t h i s a t f i r s t seems a p u z z l i n g r e s u l t . The va lue of a s h a r e i s 
based on a view of t h e f u t u r e s t ream of ne t b e n e f i t s l i k e l y to acc rue to t he 
h o l d e r . One key f a c t o r i s t h e a c t i v i t y of management. The i r d e c i s i o n s 
d e t e r m i n e f u t u r e revenue and c a p i t a l a p p r e c i a t i o n and the l e v e l of 
t r a n s a c t i o n s c o s t s borne by the t r u s t s . In a d d i t i o n , t h e r e i s t he 
management f e e which, a l t hough s m a l l r e l a t i v e to o t h e r i n s i t u t i o n s , i s 
e f f e c t i v e l y index l i n k e d and i s t h u s , a known and r e a l c o s t t o be s e t 
aga ins t any perceived b e n e f i t s . The discount ing of such cos t s by i nves to r s 
may go a long way to expla in ing the d i f fe rence between the break-up value of 
t h e t r u s t and i t s wor th as a going c o n c e r n . The s t r u c t u r e of t h e UK t r u s t 
i n d u s t r y e f f e c t i v e l y l o c k s t he m a j o r i t y of t r u s t s i n t o a permanent 
management arrangement. Indeed, a d i s t u rb ing number or t r u s t s a c t u a l l y own 
t h e i r management company or are bound to i t in o ther ways. Thus the market 
for t r u s t managment i s not pe r fec t . From a sha reho lde r ' s point or view, he 
i s buying a package where the management have permanent property r i g h t s to 
i n c u r q u e s t i o n a b l e c o s t s a t c o n s t a n t r e a l management f e e s . Whi l s t 
s h a r e h o l d e r s , as owners , can make n o i s e s and t h e l a r g e i n s t i t u t i o n s can 
demand d r a s t i c changes , t h e f i n a l s a n c t i o n i s t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e 
company. The r e t u r n s from such a c t i v i t y can be handsome, and a l t hough 
opinions may d i f f e r between c l a s se s of shareholder , the u l t i m a t e d e t e r r e n t 
w i l l be i n c r e a s i n g l y employed, u n l e s s a b e t t e r pa th can be o f f e r e d . An 
obvious s o l u t i o n would be to allow the owners to t r a n s f e r t h e i r company to 
what they p e r c e i v e as more s k i l l e d hands . T r u s t s should d i s e n t a n g l e 
t h e m s e l v e s from t h e i r management groups and amend t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n s 
accordingly . A second opt ion would be to offer per iod ic b a l l o t s on whether 
the bus iness should cont inue . Pr ices would be bid up towards break up value 
because t he p r o b a b i l i t y of b reak up would be s i g n i f i c a n t l y h i g h e r . Thus, 
any or both these opt ions could have a dramatic inpact on d i scoun ts . 
The f i n a l necessary change to ensure the surv iva l of general t r u s t s i s not 
in t h e hands of t he i n d u s t r y . As s t r e s s e d p r e v i o u s l y , d i r e c t s h a r e 
ownership i s not e f f i c i e n t r e l a t i v e to subs id ised forms of investment such 
as company pensions , insurance p o l i c i e s and house purchase. The a b i l i t y of 
t r u s t s to g e t i nvo lved in such tax e f f i c i e n t v e h i c l e s i s l i k e l y to prove 
l i m i t e d . Even so the case for such subs id i za t i on i s and w i l l continue to be 
i n c r e a s i n g l y t h i n . Tax induced sav ing may be j u s t i f i e d in t i m e s when the 
supply of loanable funds i s r e s t r i c t e d in an economy. There i s cu r r en t ly no 
c a p i t a l s h o r t a g e in t he UK a l though the p r e s e n t government , l i k e c e r t a i n 
p r e v i o u s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s , appear to have l i t t l e c lue as to how to f o s t e r 
c o n d i t i o n s in which s a v i n g s can be absorbed i n t o B r i t i s h i n d u s t r y on the 
sca l e t h a t i s pa t en t ly requi red . Ef fec t ive ly , the taxpayer i s subs id iz ing 
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overseas investment and promoting a class of ins t i tu t ion around which the 
i ssue of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y i s even more problemat ic than for j o i n t stock 
companies. There may be a clear argument for more home ownership on social 
grounds and a need to encourage certain groups, notably less well off, f i r s t 
time buyers. However i t remains questionable whether the tax payer requires 
to subs id ize house purchase on the present grand s c a l e . Thus the present 
pattern of personal savings is heavily influenced by f iscal inducements, the 
r a t i o n a l e for such s t a t e l a r g e s s e no longe r e x i s t s . Removal of tax 
incentives would increase the effective choices open to savers, reduce the 
worrying monopolistic control over investment funds and prove beneficial to 
the UK economy in the longer run. Changes are urgent ly required to 
encourage savers to take t h e i r fu tu re f i n a n c i a l provison in to t h e i r own 
hands or into the hands of managers of the i r choice. The tax xtransparent* 
s t a t u s of t r u s t s make them an i d e a l v e h i c l e for such a c t i v i t y . In 
par t icular th i s would transform the present l imited prospects for general 
t r u s t s The Investment Trust indust ry r e q u i r e s a government determined to 
t ack le the obsole te and u n j u s t i f i e d f i s c a l arrangements and consequent 
vested i n t e r e s t s which are t h r o t t l i n g p r i v a t e p a r t i c i p a t i o n in c a p i t a l 
markets. They also require a stronger drive within the t ru s t s themselves to 
be more adventurous in terms of gearing and specia l isa t ion and a concensus 
must emerge to t ack le the s t r u c t u r a l de fec t s of the sec to r . I t i s c l ea r 
that the f i r s t requirement wil l not be met quickly and that they are going 
to have to look beyond 1986 or 19&7. If stock exchange deregula t ion can 
succeed in making stock market par t ic ipat ion more accessible and provide low 
costs on small deals then the industry can win a l i t t l e breathing space on 
the lack of the i r ongoing marketing ac t iv i ty . However, no one should be in 
any doubt t h a t , un less the n e t t l e i s grasped by both government and 
industry, that in 10 years time a much smaller and markedly different sector 
wil l exis t both North and South of the border. 
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